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The following is a portion of the syllabus for Mitchell v. Helms, which was decided in June of this year, in which federal aid was trickled down through local agencies to schools, including parochial schools, and found by the Supreme Court to be permissible.
The language is sometimes hard to parse through, but (a) discusses the "entanglement" question and (b) discusses the "establishment" question.
(a) In modifying the Lemon test–which asked whether a statute (1) has a secular purpose, (2) has a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement between government and religion, see 403 U.S., at 612—613–Agostini examined only the first and second of those factors, see 521 U.S., at 222—223, recasting the entanglement inquiry as simply one criterion relevant to determining a statute’s effect, id., at 232—233. The Court also acknowledged that its cases had pared somewhat the factors that could justify a finding of excessive entanglement. Id., at 233—234. It then set out three primary criteria for determining a statute’s effect: Government aid has the effect of advancing religion if it (1) results in governmental indoctrination, (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement. Id., at 233—234. In this case, the inquiry under Agostini’s purpose and effect test is a narrow one. Because the District Court’s holding that Chapter 2 has a secular purpose is not challenged, only Chapter 2’s effect need be considered. Further, in determining that effect, only the first two Agostini criteria need be considered, because the District Court’s holding that Chapter 2 does not create an excessive entanglement is not challenged. Pp. 7—9.
(b) Whether governmental aid to religious schools results in religious indoctrination ultimately depends on whether any indoctrination that occurs could reasonably be attributed to governmental action. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S., at 226. Moreover, the answer to the indoctrination question will resolve the question whether an educational aid program “subsidizes” religion. See id., at 230—231. In distinguishing between indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination that is not, the Court has consistently turned to the neutrality principle, upholding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their religion. As a way of assuring neutrality, the Court has repeatedly considered whether any governmental aid to a religious institution results from the genuinely independent and private choices of individual parents, e.g., id., at 226. Agostini’s second primary criterion–whether an aid program defines its recipients by reference to religion, 521 U.S., at 234–is closely related to the first. It looks to the same facts as the neutrality inquiry, see id., at 225—226, but uses those facts to answer a somewhat different question–whether the criteria for allocating the aid create a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination, id., at 231. Such an incentive is not present where the aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis. Ibid. Pp. 9—15.
Peace.
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All meetings end in separation
All acquisition ends in dispersion
All life ends in death
- The Buddha
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Every hundred years, all new people
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