>>So the problem is not just "pain".
>>The problem is "a loving God, and pain".
>>
>>This, in fact, is the only "strong" argument for atheism.


>There you go again, "knowing" the "truth." You arrogant,
>whatever...


Pain is not a problem until the notion that "there should not be pain" exists.
An all-powerful, all-loving God provides the only conceivable grounds for such a notion.
Therefore, the "problem of pain" is not a problem until God is introduced to the picture.



>Well, "He" does withhold a certain amount of free will from
>us. I can't travel to the moon and back instantaneously, for
>instance.


I would ask you whether that's really an example of holding back "free will" from you or not. You can't do anything "instantaneously", can you Strav? Is there any such thing as "instantaneously"? Does not any event require the fabric of time to take place in? And if an event takes place in the fabric of time, then it "takes some time"... some, at least, even if a moment, doesn't it? Now, are you asking why you cannot fly to the moon and back "really fast"? Is that what you mean by "instantaneous"? If that's the case, the answer is "cause you havn't figured out the technology yet"... I don't see how this has anyting to do with God withholding your free will from you. Could you explain?



>Lewis's statement seems entirely ill-conceived
>here. This is actually, in my view, an important criticism of
>this argument. We clearly have only a limited amount of free
>will. Why doesn't God limit it in such a manner as to remove
>the possibility of evil

because doing so would remove the possibility of love.


>Actually, it's not nonsense . Or rather, it's only nonsense
>because you are assuming it to be so when you choose to work
>with a bivalent logic system.


What particular type of particle is this Strav? By that I mean, one that you're sure really exists or one that exists insofar as it provides you wtih a good model for observable phenomenon?



>to pass
>through a wall as it is not passing through that wall. This
>state of affairs is referred to as "quantum entanglement" and
>it has been confirmed not only by theoretical arguments but
>also through repeated experimental verification.


I have to say, I hardly believe that what's being perceived is what is actually the case.

Even if it is though, it's interesting that you're not a supernaturalist in light of it... or at least a "subnaturalist"...lol.


>As well as
>we know anything in science, we know that the quantum state of
>any system does not precisely conform to a classical logic.
>There are two standard ways of dealing with this state of
>affairs.
>
>1.) The standard view among practical physicists is that the
>world which we experience is not related to any objective
>reality, that our own personal, subjective analysis of
>experience is the only thing which provides any structure to
>the world. My guess is that you disagree with this viewpoint,
>in which case you'll be happy to learn that I do as well.
>
>2.) That a logic does apply to objects in a "real" world, but
>it is simply not a classical logic. By a "classical" logic, I
>mean a system built on the standard nontrivial arithmetic over
>Z_2. By Z_2, I mean a set with only two elements, in math
>they're usually called 0 and 1, in other logical applications
>they're more commonly referred to as "false" and "true."
>
>In fact, mathematically, one can build consistent arithmetics
>on sets which contain more elements than 0 and 1 (in fact, the
>most famous arithmetic is over the "real numbers," a continuum
>of elements). If we translate our terms from those of
>mathematics to those of logic, we obtain a consistent logical
>system in which statements can take on more values than simply
>truth and falsehood.
>
>Physicists have developed a few such nonclassical logics,
>which they have come to call "quantum logics," for use when
>describing physical systems.
>
>So now the question is available to us: if the nature of God
>can be discussed rationally, what kind of logic should the
>debate follow? The type of contradictions which you and Lewis
>are dealing with are inherently connected to classical logic,
>and they do not seem to follow under less specific
>assumptions.


So would you suggest that we EITHER use a non-bivalent system OR none at all when explaining quantaum entanglement?



>>So if God chose to give us free choice, He could not at the
>>same time take it away and force us to choose Him. It's
>one
>>or the other.



>One or the other. Exactly. Why should we assume this?


Because two contradictory statements cannot both be true.




>Angles? dictionary.com: "A Germanic people that migrated to
>England from southern Jutland in the 5th century A.D., founded
>the kingdoms of Northumbria, East Anglia, and Mercia, and
>together with the Jutes and Saxons formed the Anglo-Saxon
>peoples."


lmao. yes, them.



>You're offended by my use of curse words, I'm offended by your
>use of the word "dig."


It's part of the standard idiom here at OKP.


>I'm tempted to start arguing with you about abortion policy
>here. But I don't think we can handle the distraction.


How might you begin that? I'm all ears.