>It's real simple: the revisionists are wrong. Pinko, Ho,
>and the rest...wrong.

If I offered left-wing
sources, you'd be accussing
me of citing "Marxist prop-
aganda" or "Postmodern tripe".
Instead, I provide you with
testomonies from Under Secre-
tary of State Joseph Grew Ad-
miral William Leahy, the Chief
of Staff to President Roosevelt
and then to President Truman,
Army Chief of Staff General
George Marshall. Sec. of War
Henry Stimson; and finally,
Dwight Eisenhower who argued
the bombs were unecessary,
and I'm labeled a "revisionist".

Could you conservatives come
up with something better, than
to label everyone you disagree
with?

>Japan had no intentions of surrendering before Nagasaki, at
>least unconditionally.

I already stated they refused
unconditional surrender. But
why did they refuse uncondit-
ional surrender? Because "the
absence of any assurance rega-
rding the Emperor's fate became
Japan's chief objection to the
Potsdam Proclamation" (Pacific
War Research Society, The Day
Man Lost, pg. 212-214).

Now, one could argue that the
Japanese should not have been
able to dictate the terms of
their surrender and I would
agree with that. HOWEVER, the
refusal by Japan to acknowledge
the Potsdam Proclamation does
not in any way, shape, or form
justify the use of nuclear
weapons against two civilian
populations.

Besides, onn July 2, 1945, Sec.
of War Henry Stimson and Truman
discussed a proposal by Stimson
to call for Japan to surrender.
Stimson's memo to the President
advised, "I personally think
that if in saying this we should
add that we do not exclude a con-
stitutional monarchy under her
present dynasty, it would subst-
antially add to the chances of
acceptance". Stimson's proposed
surrender demand stated that the
reformed Japanese government "may
include a constitutional monarchy
under the present dynasty" (U.S.
Dept. of State, Potsdam 1, pg.
889-894).

Even Truman's advisors such as
Joseph Grew and Henry Stimson ar-
gued that the surrender terms sh-
ould be modified in order to bring
a quick end to the war. According
to Admiral William D. Leahy, the
highest ranking military official
in the U.S. at the time as chief
of staff to the president, "The
Japanese were already defeated and
ready to surrender.... The use of
this barbarous weapon was of no ma-
terial assistance in our war against
Japan."

Al this basically means that top
officials in the Truman Admin-
istration -- including Truman him-
self -- KNEW 1) that Japan was de-
feated and 2) that there were feas-
ible alternatives to nuclear con-
fligration.